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Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence on the rise of the dollar as an international 
currency, focusing  on  its  role  in  the  conduct  of  trade and the  provision of 
trade credit. We show that the shift to the dollar occurred much earlier than 
conventionally  supposed:  during  and  immediately  after  World  War  I.  Not 
just  market forces but  also  policy  support –  the  Fed  in  its  role as  market 
maker – was important for the dollar’s overtaking of sterling as the leading 
international  currency.    On  balance,  this  experience  challenges  the  popular 
notion of international currency status as being determined mainly by market 
size.  It  suggests  that  the  popular  image  of  strongly  increasing  returns  and  
pervasive  network  externalities  leaving  room  for  only  one  monetary 
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This paper provides new evidence on the rise of the dollar as an international currency, focusing on 
its role in the conduct of trade and the provision of trade credit. We show that the shift to the dollar 
occurred much earlier than conventionally supposed: during and immediately after World War I. Not 
just market forces but also policy support – the Fed in its role as market maker – was important for 
the dollar’s overtaking of sterling as the leading international currency.  On balance, this experience 
challenges the popular notion of international currency status as being determined mainly by market 
size.  It  suggests  that  the  popular  image  of  strongly  increasing  returns  and  pervasive  network 
externalities leaving room for only one monetary technology is misleading. 
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In this paper we consider the role of central banks in shaping financial structures and 
building financial markets, and how their actions can have implications for the place of those 
markets in the world.  The case on which we focus is the making of a market in dollar-




This case speaks to several issues that arise in connection with central banking and 
monetary policy today.  A first issue concerns the role of policy, and specifically central bank 
policy, in fostering local-currency securities markets.  Since the financial crises of the 1990s, 
Asian and Latin American countries have made concerted efforts to develop markets in debt 
instruments denominated in local currency as a way of limiting the currency mismatches that 
are a source of financial fragility.  Governments have issued a range of maturities in the effort 
to establish benchmark yield curves.  Central banks have intervened in the secondary market to 
provide liquidity.  While there has been progress in developing local markets, achievement has 
not always matched aspiration, especially where internationally-traded debt securities are 
concerned.
2  Our historical case, where the United States itself sought to solve the same 
problem, sheds historical light on this current policy issue. 
 
A second topic to which our analysis speaks is international currency competition.  It is 
widely argued that there is only room for one international currency in the global system.  The 
theoretical assertion is that increasing returns to using a national currency in international 
transactions are strong; network externalities are pronounced.  The empirical assertion is that 
the pound sterling dominated international transactions in the first half of the 20
th century, the 
dollar in its second half.  In recent work we have shown that this last assertion is not accurate 
for foreign-exchange reserves.  Sterling and the dollar in fact shared the reserve-currency role 
more or less equally in the 1920s and 1930s.
3   
 
From a theoretical point of view, it can be objected that network effects are weaker for 
international reserves than other international currency functions.  While it pays to for 
importers and exporters use the same currency as other importers and exporters when, inter 
alia, invoicing and settling trade, a central bank has no similar incentive to concentrate its 
reserve portfolio in the same currency as other central banks; to the contrary, it will have an 
incentive to hold a diversified portfolio of reserves.  But here we show that what was true of 
international reserves (that is, of official use) prior to 1914 was also true trade credit (of private 
use).  For the bankers’ acceptances used for trade credit, just as for international reserves, 
sterling and the dollar shared the market.   
 
For those who wish to draw an implication for the 21
st century, it is that network effects 
giving rise to increasing returns have limits.
4  There is no reason therefore why the dollar and 
the euro, notwithstanding their respective recent difficulties, cannot both be consequential 
international currencies.
5 
                                                             
2 On the evidence, see Hausmann and Panizza (2010). 
3 Something that has obvious implications for thinking about the future.  The recent work in question is 
Eichengreen and Flandreau (2009). 
4 Here we echo a point made by Liebowitz and Margolis (1990) in another context. 
5 Or why other currencies could not eventually join them.   
 
Related to this is the question of how quickly we should expect China’s currency to 
gain an important international role.  As we show, the United States went in only ten years 
from a position where the dollar had no place as an international currency and New York was a 
negligible source of finance for international trade to one where the dollar was at least 
sterling’s coequal and New York rivaled London as a source of trade credit.
6  This is not to 
assert that the renminbi will necessarily rival the dollar and the euro in 2020.  But it does 
suggest that, if network effects are less powerful than commonly asserted, the renminbi’s 
emergence may be quicker than widely presumed.  
 
Our evidence also highlights the regional dimension of international currency 
competition.
7 In the second and third decades of the 20
th century, U.S. banks and bankers’ 
acceptances followed U.S. trade, and U.S. trade followed the laws of gravity.
8  Foreign 
branching by U.S. banks occurred predominantly in places like Latin America where U.S. 
trade, for reasons of geography, was most extensive.  This gives grounds for thinking that the 
renminbi’s role as an invoicing and settlement currency and China’s as a source of trade 
finance will be greatest in Asia, where its trade will grow most rapidly. 
 
  Finally, there is concern that central banks’ extraordinary actions in 2007-9, taken to 
provide liquidity to distressed financial markets by purchasing commercial paper, mortgage-
backed securities and other financial assets outright, created a reservoir of inflationary pressure 
that will burst when bank lending picks up (in clear, central banks’ market-making and market-
supporting actions would have created a conflict with their price stability mandate).  There are 
fears that central bank action created a new credit bubble destined to burst, and that their 
interventions merely disguise problems that will become acute once they exit. There is concern 
about crowding out: central banks’ readiness to step in as market makers of last resort may 
discourage other buyers from reentering the market.  There is concern that the indiscriminate 
purchase of securities by central banks will encourage the renewed issuance of financial 
instruments of dubious quality, setting the stage for another round of financial excesses and 
problems.  We note that the same criticisms were levied against central banks’ market-making 
activities in the 1920s.
9 While we do not have definitive answers to all these questions, we 
offer some food for thought. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 1 we provide some 
historical and institutional background on the case in question.  Section 2 then focuses on the 
transitional period.  It shows how dollar acceptances as an instrument for trade finance 
expanded rapidly in the 1920s from a position of, essentially, nonexistence in 1914.  It 
highlights the actions of the Federal Reserve in promoting the rise of the market.  Section 3 
turns next to the position of the incumbent, sterling. We present new evidence showing that 
sterling shared the status of international currency with the dollar all through the 1920s. 
                                                             
6 With some exaggeration, Alexander Noyes, financial editor of the New York Times, argued that the replacement 
of London by New York and of sterling by the dollar occurred “almost immediately” with the outbreak of World 
War I (Silber 2007, p.168). 
7 See Flandreau and Jobst (2009), who document the influence of trade and geography on currency 
internationalization before World War I. 
8 That is to say, it flowed in the directions and proportions suggested by the gravity model of international trade. 
9 See Rothbard (1963), pp.117-123.   
Section 4, finally, reports evidence on the determinants of individual American banks’ position 
in the acceptance market. It allows us to assess the relative importance of market forces, 
meaning trade and the general economic environment, and public policy initiatives, meaning 
the support from, or “private-public partnership” with, the Federal Reserve, in the growth of 
the market. 
 
We conclude with a summary and some implications for today. 
 
 
1.   Background 
 
Exporters need credit to purchase materials and pay their bills while their merchandise 
is in transit and payment has not been received.  Typical practice prior to 1913 was for an 
American exporter would go to his bank with documents showing that he had shipped the 
goods and indicating what he would be paid in the future.  If his collateral and credit were 
good, he could get his money immediately rather than having to wait for the goods to arrive in 
the foreign market and the buyer’s payment to then arrive in the United States.   
 
His bank financed the operation by drawing on a correspondent (or “acceptor”) with 
which it had made prior arrangement.  Upon receipt of the bill, which specified the 
commodities shipped and the name of the drawer (the U.S. bank), the correspondent whose 
name was mentioned in the document “accepted” the security.  The resulting instruments were 
thus known as “acceptances.”  Triply guaranteed by the goods, by the drawer, and by the 
acceptor, they could be sold on to other investors.  A simple bank-to-customer credit was 
thereby transformed into a liquid, tradable instrument. 
 
U.S. exports grew faster than those of any other nation in the decades leading up to 
World War I.  By 1912 the United States was the leading trading nation.  It is thus striking that 
virtually no trade credit was provided by U.S. banks or denominated in dollars.  Instead, 
American banks seeking to provide these services did so through correspondent banks in 
London.  These acceptances were denominated in sterling, since that was the currency with 
which the London banks, the secondary-market investors to whom they sold the paper, and the 
Bank of England were all accustomed. 
 
The London market had a number of strengths.
10  It had a well-developed population of 
banks, generically referred to as merchant banks for their origins in helping merchants with the 
finance of trade in the early 19
th century.
11  Possessing networks of overseas correspondents, 
they were able to originate a large volume of acceptances.
12 Having originated acceptances, the 
banks turned around and distributed this paper on a large secondary market of individual and 
institutional investors.  They could distribute the acceptances to the market either individually 
or in bulk (in packages known as “parcels”) through the agency of bill brokers.
13 In the unusual 
                                                             
10 As contemporaries such as Jacobs (1910) recognized. 
11 And also private, joint stock and colonial institutions with international reach. 
12 Over time, the large commercial banks with their substantial international branch networks joined them. 
13 See King (1936).   
event that there was no ready purchaser, they could offload them to the Bank of England at 
“Bank rate.”
14   
This trio of factors – Britain’s early start as a trading nation, resulting in the merchant 
banks’ first-mover advantage; a large and active secondary market; and a market-maker of last 
resort – made for low costs and strongly increasing returns.  They explain why London 
monopolized the provision of trade credit and why sterling was the dominant international 
currency.  They explain why New York and the dollar played no international role. There was 
room for only one international currency, it is said.  And sterling, with its first-mover 
advantage, was it.
15 
But another interpretation of why New York could not break into the market is that 
regulatory prohibitions and not increasing returns prevented U.S. banks from entering.  Under 
the National Banking Act, American banks were prohibited from branching abroad.
16  Federal 
legislation prevented banks from dealing in trade acceptances.
17  And the U.S. lacked a central 
bank to backstop the market.  Given this, it is hardly surprising that the dollar played no 
international role. 
 
Two bits of circumstantial evidence are consistent with the alternative view that 
increasing returns and network effects were limited and that there was room in the market for 
more than one international currency.  First, foreign exchange trading and trade finance went 
                                                             
14 They could also secure advances from the central bank against the parcels. 
15 This narrative was prominent in the debates surrounding the creation of the Federal Reserve System.  In a 
pamphlet written for National Monetary Commission, for example, Jacobs (1910, p. 13) deplored a state of affairs 
in which U.S. bankers were forced to transact via London, observing how this “adds to the importance of London 
and militates against the development of New York as a financial center.”  John J. Arnold, First Vice-President of 
the First National Bank of Chicago, similarly argued that the “three cornered arrangement” whereby London 
banks financed American foreign trade could “and should be eliminated” so that a “direct dollar exchange market” 
be created between the US and South America and the Orient so as to deny London “the undue advantage which 
this center has had in the past” (Parrini 1968, p. 105).  U.S. business and policy leaders supporting the 
internationalization of New York and the U.S. dollar referred to the amount paid annually to British banks in 
acceptance fees as the “tribute” (see e.g. Warburg 1910).  Of course the metaphor was flawed: British bankers 
financed American trade more cheaply than New York bankers would have (Phelps 1927, p. 102; Parrini 1968, p. 
103). The actual amount involved was a small fraction of U.S. trade or GDP. In 1927, when U.S. banks had 
secured a large share of the global market for acceptances, the Acceptance Bulletin estimated the annual saving to 
have been a “material” $5 million. Even this figure is an upper bound, since it does not subtract the resource cost 
for U.S. banks to supply the acceptances.   
16 Trust companies could branch abroad, but few did, and those which set up foreign offices did so mainly in order 
to gather information on foreign bonds, which were attractive assets to add to their portfolios since these matched 
the maturity of their liabilities to their trustees.  Some state-charters also allowed state banks to branch abroad, 
although few if any ever did.  There was one specialized institution, the International Banking Corporation, set up 
by the Remington Arms Company to assist it in its foreign sales, that operated foreign branches but was 
prohibited from engaging in domestic banking. 
17 Actually the relevant legislation only lacked provisions explicitly authorizing banks to engage in this business, 
but the courts, channeling long-standing American suspicion of concentrated financial power, repeatedly ruled 
against their efforts to do so.  While other forms of short term credit emerged, they were less liquid than European 
style acceptances. One form of short-term negotiable security that came to existence and played some domestic 
role was the so-called single name “commercial paper.” Commercial paper was issued by industrial and 
commercial enterprises of substantial standing and traded in organized markets. But while commercial paper paid 
with “clockwork regularity,” it was relatively illiquid (James 1995, p. 224, drawing on Foulke 1931, pp.80, 84-6).    
hand in hand, and sterling did not monopolize foreign exchange trading.
18  Second, the use of a 
currency as central bank reserves and in foreign trade and payments went together, smoothing 
trade and payments being one reason why central banks hold reserves, and sterling by no 
means monopolized foreign exchange reserves.
19  This is consistent with the presumption that 
sterling was the leading international currency.  But it is inconsistent with the belief that it was 
the only one. 
 
Second, the evidence in Flandreau and Jobst (2009) is inconsistent with strongly 
increasing returns.  The authors construct a model of the pre-1914 international monetary 
system that allows for strategic externalities. Currencies are traded abroad as a function of their 
value for users. Value is greater when currencies are liquid. This encourages more users to hold 
liquid currencies and generates positive feedback. Persistence emerges when the feedback loop 
is sufficiently powerful. Flandreau and Jobst estimate this model using pre-1914 data and reject 
the presence of strong lock-in effects.  These findings thus cast doubt on popular notions of 
network externalities being an insurmountable obstacle to the rise of the dollar.  
 
The 1920s permit a more direct test.    The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created a U.S. 
central bank authorized to discount and purchase trade acceptances as a mechanism for 
smoothing interest rates and managing credit conditions. It removed the prohibition on foreign 
branching and authorized banks to deal in trade acceptances.
20  World War I then disrupted the 
provision of trade credit by London and the other European financial centers, giving the New 
York market an opportunity to get up and running. 
 
One can thus imagine three hypotheses for what one should expect to see in the 1920s. 
 
•  Network effects and increasing returns were sufficiently powerful that London 
retained its first mover advantage. Lock-in being strong, the equilibrium would 
not shift even if an alternative was more efficient for the world as a whole.
21 
 
•  While network effects and increasing returns were strong, central banks as 
architects could shift the system between equilibria.  Although New York 
                                                             
   Flandreau and Jobst (2005) show that bills denominated in sterling, francs and marks had the widest foreign 
circulation. Those in sterling were traded everywhere, those in francs in 80 per cent of foreign markets, those in 
German marks in 59 per cent.  
19 According to Lindert (1969), sterling accounted for 51 per cent of identified reserves in 1913, the franc 33 per 
cent, the mark 16 per cent. 
20 One motive for the act was precisely to create a market in trade acceptances in New York, the belief being that a 
market in securities backed by receivables would be more stable than one dominated by speculative stock market 
transactions – this having been a popular explanation for the 1907 financial crisis. 
21  This is essentially the QWERTY story of strong lock-in (David 1985). This presumption is found in some 
recent historical literature in which it is argued that sterling remained the leading international currency until after 
World War II as well as in accounts by economists. Modern accounts assert that, once established, London’s first-
mover advantage was difficult, even impossible to overturn. For example, Roberts and Kynaston (2000, p.192) 
argue that “the lesson of history is that – once established – leading financial centers retain their primacy until 
toppled by an external shock.”  Michie (2007, p. 78) similarly argues that World War I was a major shock for 
London’s supremacy, but was “insufficient to destroy the strong position it had established in the years before 
1914.”  Others like Aliber (1968) and, more recently, Chinn and Frankel (2008), have echoed Triffin (1960) in 
suggesting that dollar only overtook sterling after World War II.      
lacked a secondary market of individual and institutional investors for much of 
the period, the Fed provided resources to shift to the new equilibrium (a policy 
analogous to “big push” in models of underdevelopment with multiple 
equilibria). The Fed acted as market maker of last resort, allowing the dollar to 
supplant sterling as the currency used for trade finance already in the 1920s.
22  
 
•  Increasing returns were not strong enough to give one currency a natural 
monopoly, and network effects were not sufficiently pervasive for strong lock-
in.  As a result of both market forces and policy intervention, monopoly gave 
way to duopoly.  Sterling and the dollar could and did share the international 
currency role in the 1920s. 
 
 
2.  The Rise of New York 
 
The Federal Reserve System played a key role in fostering the international role of the 
dollar.  It did so as a carrier of regulatory reform. But, in addition, it actively promoted the new 
market.
23     
Figure 1 uses interest rates to measure the competitiveness of the London and New 
York markets. While the cost of acceptance credit had other components (taxes, the bank’s 
commission, exchange risk insurance etc.), the interest rate was the largest part.
24 The rate for 
London is the open market rate – the rate at which acceptances were bought by investors. We 
compare it to the open market rate on U.S. acceptances when possible. But since U.S. rates for 
acceptances only become available in January 1917, we also show prime U.S. commercial 
paper rates (i.e. the rate on prime short-term credit instruments issued by corporate borrowers 
of high standing), which begin earlier.
25 
                                                             
22 Previous students of strategic externalities (Liebowitz and Margolis 1990) have argued in that the strong lock-in 
suggested by the QWERTY hypothesis is unlikely. In the conventional tale, large players are able to subsidize 
adoption of the new standard and, once it is adopted, agents coordinate on it and the subsidy is no longer needed. 
In our context, these players would be central banks or possibly public-private partnership of banks and policy 
makers.  In this spirit, Ferderer (2003, p.666) argues that “Federal Reserve Banks played a key role by reducing 
the risk borne by private dealers and propelling the [dollar acceptances] market to a high-liquidity equilibrium.”  
Silber (2007, p.168) praises the steps taken by Treasury Secretary McAdoo at the onset of World War I to keep 
the dollar onto gold, persuading markets of its credibility. Had this policy not been implemented, he concludes, 
“Britain could have easily remained the undisputed, if somewhat battered, champion of international finance until 
the Second World War. It almost happened.” 
23 While the first effect was permanent, the second was more transient, the Fed withdrawing from the market after 
the summer of 1931. 
24 This makes the interest differential a fair approximation of the relative cost of financing a shipment in the 
alternative centers and currencies.  See Velay (1932), p. 121. 
25 This is an appropriate comparison, since commercial paper benefited in similar fashion from the new 
arrangements.  The Federal Reserve Act was intended to promote the commercial paper market, and Federal 
Reserve rediscount rates on commercial paper were close to, if slightly higher than, the rate on acceptances. As 
recalled by James (1995, p.227), the Federal Reserve Act was defined as “An Act to provide for the Establishment 
of Federal Reserve Banks … and to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper.”   As for information on 
dollar acceptances, the editors of the Acceptance Bulletin constructed monthly series from material submitted by 
reporting banks.  The resulting series is available January 1917 to April 1936 (the Bulletin having been 
discontinued at that point).  From 1917 onward, the Bulletin also distinguished acceptances created to finance 
exports, imports, shipments and goods stored in foreign countries, domestic shipments, domestic warehouse   
 
Until World War I, the U.S. commercial paper rate was continually above the open 
market rate in London, sometimes by as much as 200 basis points. The creation of the Federal 
Reserve was followed by a sharp reduction in the differential.  By 1915 the commercial paper 
rate was 100 basis points below the London open market rate.  In 1917, when dollar acceptance 
rates become available, they are even lower than commercial paper rates.   
 
Figure 1.  London and New York Money Market Rates, 1900-1939 
 
Source: see text. 
 
 
The period centered on 1915 thus saw a revolution in the relative position of London 
and New York. Figure 2 shows that the total outstanding acceptances of U.S. banks began 
rising that same year.
26 The Guaranty Trust Company claims to have been first to begin 
originating acceptances and allowing foreign correspondents to draw on it.  Our data support 
this, showing $18.2 million of acceptances in its December 1914 balance-sheet, a date when 
the market was probably not much bigger than that.
27  Over the course of 1915, more banks 
then began entering the market. This is when the interest differential in Figure 1 reverses.  
These changes may have been due not to the advent of the Fed, of course, but to the 
dislocations of the war and limited sterling convertibility. However, whereas the latter 
presumably would have had only transitory effects, the shift in London-New York interest 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
credits and dollar exchange   Federal Reserve reports and bulletins then provide information on acceptances 
between 1936 and 1939. 
26 From Federal Reserve statistics and the Acceptance Bulletin. 
27 It complains, however, the acceptances it originated failed to find ready buyers, forcing it to hold its own paper 
(Guaranty Trust 1919).   
differentials was permanent. While this is consistent with both our second and third hypotheses 
above, it is inconsistent with the first (emphasizing the overwhelming importance of first-
mover advantage). 
Figure 2 highlights the role of the Fed in nurturing the infant industry; it shows 
acceptances in the Fed’s custody from 1915 through 1939.   The Fed’s Annual Report for 1915 
points to this year as when the market for acceptances first showed signs of life.
28 The annual 
report describes the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston made “every effort to further and develop 
that business,” buying acceptances from Massachusetts banking institutions engaged in 
financing “hides and wool from South America and cotton and jute from the orient and other 
sections of the world” in the early months of 1915, trade that had previously been financed 




Figure 2. Total Outstanding Acceptances and Amounts Held by the Federal 
Reserve Board (Own Account or for Account of Foreign Correspondents), in $ b. 
 
Source: See text. 
Further evidence can be garnered from the minutes of the Open Market Investment 
Committee.
30 For instance a statement pertaining to the policy adopted in the April 1923 
meeting compared the alleged hands-off policy of the Bank of England (allowing the 
maintenance of a spread between the open market rate and the rediscount rate) and 
recommended a more aggressive policy for the Fed: “A Policy as drastic as that of the Bank of 
England, for instance, which always aims to make the market pay a penalty rate upon recourse 
                                                             
28 See the Federal Reserve Board’s  Annual Report for 1915. 
29 The report also mentions that 7 additional banks in the area had moved into the acceptance business (Federal 
Reserve System, Annual Report for 1915, p. 136). 
   . A body created in 1923 to monitor Fed’s investment and money market policy and operations.    
to the bank, is not always suited to the American bill market, and if applied might have an 
adverse effect upon the establishment of dollar credit and dollar bills in overseas trade and 
world markets, and it seems reasonably certain that the sterling credit would quickly drive the 
dollar credit from those markets. It is probable therefore that we must continue for some time a 
somewhat paternalistic attitude towards the market for dollar bills in this country”.
31  Other 
passages point in the same direction.  Together they suggest that during the 1910s and 1920s, 
the Fed made a sustained effort to render dollar acceptances more attractive relative to their 
sterling competitors. 
 
We see in Figure 2 that the market in acceptances experienced two boom-and-bust 
cycles. There was a sharp increase toward the end of World War I, coincident with the increase 
in U.S. trade associated with direct American military involvement. The peak reached in 1919-
20 was then followed by a sharp decline. The second expansion started in 1922-3 and peaked 
after the stock market and the economy in 1929. The subsequent decline in the volume of 
acceptances persisted through the 1930s.  
Figure 3.  Share of the Fed in the Acceptance Market and Relative Interest Rates 
 
Source: Authors’ computations from sources in text. 
Looking at total acceptances in conjunction with Fed holdings directs one’s attention to 
periods like 1917 when the central bank was evidently the only purchaser on the secondary 
                                                             
   . Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research, Federal Reserve Open Market Investment 
Committee (Open Market Policy Conference), Excerpts, 1923 to 1928. Quote taken from “Excerpts of the Federal 
Open Market Investment Committee during 1923”, p. 5.    
market.
32 On average the Fed held between a quarter and two-thirds of outstanding 
acceptances.
33  Suggestively, the withdrawal of the Fed from the market coincides with the 
decline of the industry in the early 1930s. 
 
Figure 3 juxtaposes two indicators of official support for the market. The first is the 
Fed’s holdings as a share of outstanding acceptances. The second is the spread between the 
Federal Reserve and market rates for acceptances. The narrower the spread, the stronger the 
support (a lower spread suggesting that the Fed was more anxious to step into the market). 
With the notable exception of the wake of the two trade busts (1921 and 1931), the Fed kept its 
rate close the market rate and purchased a substantial fraction of acceptances outstanding.  
Again, this is consistent with the view that the U.S. central bank played an active and, indeed, 
critical role in fostering the new market in dollar-denominated trade credit. 
3.  The Empire Strikes Back 
We turn next to conditions on the London market. Figure 4 shows the correlation 
between Bank rate (the Bank of England’s rediscount rate) and the open market discount rate 
before and after 1914 (analogous to Figure 3 for the United States).  The correlation loosens 
during and after the war, suggesting that the Bank of England, grappling with a weak sterling 
exchange rate, could not support the market as freely (it faced a trade-off between market 
support and protection of its gold reserves).
34 
 
Figure 4. Bank of England Rediscount Rate and Open Market Rate 1900-1939 
 
 
Source: NBER Historical Macro Database. 
                                                             
32 Holdings are measured here as total holdings, i.e. holdings for its own account and for the account of foreign 
customers, mostly central banks. 
33 Again, either on its own account or on that of foreign central banks holding deposits with it. 
   See Sayers (1967) for a discussion of the conflicts created by the multiplicity of policy objectives during the 
1920s and the partial remedies found to deal with it.     
 
Notwithstanding those difficulties, the Bank of England and the British government 
made a determined effort not just to maintain London’s position but to expand its reach.
35 The 
war created an opportunity to address the challenge from German banks and the potential 
challenge from the United States.   
In 1916, a blueprint for a post-war UK-centered international economic system was 
described at the Paris Economic Conference. Market access and shipping privileges would be 
used to reward allies and punish enemies and neutrals – meaning Germany and the United 
States, respectively. Reliance on the Empire, together with selective Continental alliances, 
would provide the critical mass for a London-centered European commercial and financial 
system.
36 
International, overseas and merchant banks were encouraged to expand their 
geographical reach and received active official support. The British government seized the 
London branch of the Anglo-Austrian Bank, a leading Vienna based institution with links to 
Germany. Once the government and its friends in the private sector acquired its records and 
correspondence, they could see how its affiliated institutions operated in Central Europe.  This 
knowledge “eased the way for private British interests to seize control of the Anglo-Austrian 
network.”
37 After the war, such expropriations were justified under Article 248 of the 
Versailles Treaty permitting the organization, in 1922, under the aegis of the Bank of England 
of the “new” Anglo-Austrian Bank, which in turn controlled the new Anglo-Czech Bank, 
formed to take over the branches of the former Anglo-Austrian bank in Czechoslovakia. 
Similar policies were adopted for Turkey, where German banks had had a prominent role 
before World War I and which like the Habsburg Empire had been an ally of Germany. 
To what extent did these policies extend sterling’s reach? Consider Latin America, a 
region where Britain’s financial leadership was actively disputed by the United States. Before 
World War I, the role of the mark in financing Latin trade had expanded on the basis of 
growing German industrial exports. Integral to this process were German overseas banks: the 
Banco Aleman Transatlantico, the Deutsch-Sudamerikanische Bank, Brazilianische Bank für 
Deutschland, and the Bank für Chile un Deutschland, which were active primarily in 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile.
38 Most were controlled by or affiliated with the “great banks” that 
were the pillars of the German banking system.
39  
With the outbreak of the war, the British authorities sought to limit Germany’s capacity 
to trade and the German banks’ ability to extend trade finance. The Latin and London branches 
of German overseas banks were shut down or expropriated.
40  Utilizing information obtained 
                                                             
35 See Robinson (1923), Baster (1935) and  Jones (1995). 
   Parrini argues that U.S. declaration of war and Wilson’s sponsoring of the League of Nation were direct 
responses to this challenge. They led Britain to revise earlier plans and offer the U.S. “co-chairmanship” of the 
global trading and financial system (Parrini 1967).  
   Parrini (1967), p.129. 
   See Battilossi (2006) and Briones and Villela (2006). 
   The Deutsche Bank, the Discontogesellschaft, or the Dresdner Bank. Such arrangements were not specific to 
Latin America. The Deutsche-Asiatische Bank for instance was active in China. 
   In 1914, the Allies forced the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank Branches in China to shut down. These branches were 
barely able to resume their operation in 1918.  See King (1989) and Horesh (2008).    
through these expropriations, British merchant and overseas banks moved to fill the void. 
Table 1 shows data for 1913 and 1921 assembled from the Bankers’ Almanac. We compare 
Germany’s four Latin American banks with three British rivals. As can be seen, German 
overseas banks lost their parent connections in London and were replaced by British merchant 
banks. The merchant houses that moved, Kleinworts, Shroders, and Seligmans, were well-
established London institutions and active in the sterling area.
41 Where the capital and balance 
sheets of British and German banks operating in Latin America had been comparable in 1913, 
British banks were much larger in 1921.
42 We take this as indicating that accounts suggesting 
that the war was good for the U.S. but bad for Britain lack balance. The use of political means 
to eliminate German competition could and in some cases did reinforce the position of 
London.
43 
What was the net effect on the sterling and dollar acceptance markets? Figure 5 shows 
their evolution.
44 We use here the most comprehensive definition of sterling acceptances, 
meaning both those drawn abroad and those drawn domestically, and the corresponding U.S. 
totals.
45 The value of dollar and sterling acceptances was quite close in the late 1920s. This 
figure for private international claims resembles to a striking degree the findings of 
Eichengreen and Flandreau (2009) for official international reserve holdings.
46 
Again as with official reserves, the dollar’s share then shrank in the economic crisis of 
the 1930s.  Where the nominal value of sterling acceptances fell by half between the peak in 
1929 and the middle of the 1930s, dollar acceptances in 1935 were barely a seventh what they 
had been in 1929.   Again, this parallels what we have found for changes in the composition of 
international reserve holdings between the 1930s and 1930s.  In the case of acceptances (as in 
the case of reserves), the fact that the U.S. depression was more severe and that U.S. trade 
contracted more rapidly than British trade is part of the story, but only a part.  We return to 
this. 
The picture that emerges from this section is one of competition between two 
international currencies, not the dominance of one. Reinforcing the point, Figure 6 compares 
                                                             
   .Andof German origin and with a strong German information base 
   Inflation played a role in the reduction in the capital base but geopolitical dislocations were decisive. Had 
shareholders of German overseas banks felt that recapitalization would bring revenues they would have supplied 
the needed resources. 
43 We also find the grabbing hand where did not expect it. with the UK and U.S. stripping Germany from its 
banking system and taking advantage of the war to expand dramatically. 
44 There is no British equivalent of the Acceptance Bulletin (no central body collected relevant information).  The 
figures we report are for the sub-period 1927-1937. Truptil (1936, p. 159 ff) used material from the Committee on 
Finance and Industry (1931) together with assumptions about stability of various types of banks’ proportions in 
totals to impute missing information. Baster (1937) then extended Truptil’s estimates. We have also drawn on 
unpublished estimates by the Bank of England. Starting in the 1930s the Bank provided estimates of the volume 
of acceptances (Bank of England Archive EID4/86).  We thank Olivier Accominotti for this material. 
45 This seems to be the best way to go: because domestic trade could also be financed by domestic drafts, trying to 
disentangle domestic and foreign drafts is hopeless. Statisticians of British acceptances typically attempt  to 
identify acceptances from banks’ balances-sheets, as the publishers of the Acceptance Bulletin did for the United 
States. 
   . This is only half surprising of course since central bank foreign exchange reserves mostly comprised bills (or 
acceptances), deposits and government bonds. In the Fed’s case foreign deposits were reinvested on acceptaces, 
thus establishing a direct link between demand and supply.    
the market-bank spreads for London and New York. After 1922, spreads in the two markets are 
comparable. Insofar as the spread between official and market rates is indicative of central 
bank support, Figure 6 is telling us that central banks and currencies competed with one 
another.  
Figure 5. Dollar and Sterling Acceptances 1927-1937 (millions of £) 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on documents described in the text. 
The 1930s then saw both central banks walk away from the market, the Fed even more 
so than the Bank of England. There is a striking correlation with Figure 5, which shows total 
U.S. acceptances declining much more dramatically than total British acceptances. 
4.  The Supply of Acceptances: Evidence from Panel Data 
 
In this section we look more closely at the growth of the dollar acceptance market in 
the 1920s. A first interpretation of this phenomenon is as market led.  U.S. banks were capable 
of entering the market; they only had to be freed of regulatory restrictions. A second 
interpretation is that the transition was government led.  It would not have occurred had the 
Fed not substituted for the missing secondary market. 
 
One can identify two variants of the market-led hypothesis. One emphasizes branching.  
Overseas branches were needed to gather information on foreign markets of the sort that the 
London banks had traditionally.  They were needed in order to be able to conveniently attract 
the business of merchants who did not reside in the United States.  This is the dominant view in 
much previous historical research as well as contemporary policy debate. Exporters, in    
particular, insisted on a US system of branch that would handle US trade and US trade 
secrets.
47 
Figure 6. Spreads between Official and Market Rates in London and New York 
1917-1939 
 
Source: Source: NBER Historical Macro Database. 
 
 
The other variant is that U.S. banks, once liberated from restrictions on dealing in trade 
credit, could build on their existing connections with importers and exporters. It was foreign 
trade and not foreign branches on which the new acceptance business rested.  Previous scholars 
have paid less attention to this hypothesis, but Figure 7 (which compares annual US trade -- 
imports plus exports -- with the total amount of acceptances originated annually) is at least not 
inconsistent with it. 
Who did branch and when? Table 2 summarizes the extent of branching.
   The number 
of banks that developed networks of foreign branches, either directly or through subsidiaries, 
                                                             
47 See Phelps (1927), Lewis (1938), Parrini (1969), Cleveland and Huertas (1985), Stallings (1987) and more 
recently, Cattani and Tschoegl (2002). 
48 On the surface previous estimates differ, although on closer inspection discrepancies can be explained away. 
This we did by constructing our own estimates from the Bankers’ Almanac. Phelps provides a table with number 
branches by bank at some benchmark years (1913, 1920, 1926) and another one with banks by region in 1926 
(Phelps (1927), 211& 212). Lewis (1938) expands Phelps’ table for branching to 1919, 1924, 1929, 1933, and 
1935. Parrini (1969, p.116) offers a decomposition of branching in 1920 by country and banking “family” (the 
National City-International Banking Corporation conglomerate vs. the Morgan affiliates. Cleveland and Huertas 
(1985, pp.324-5 provide a table describing National City Bank/Citigroup per region. Finally Stallings (1987 p.70) 
tracks U.S. branches in Latin America between 1914 and 1930. The Bankers Almanac gives for each city a list of    
was limited.  National City Bank, First National Bank of Boston, Guaranty Trust, and Chase 
dominate the list. Other institutions boasted “representative offices,” but these representatives 
(sometimes single individuals) in other countries were not branches proper. This is not 
inconsistent with industrialists complains (Parrini 1969) that banks were not doing enough. 
Figure 7.  U.S. Trade (Imports plus Exports) and Total Acceptances Originated 
Annually (millions USD) 
 
Source: See text. Total acceptances originated annually are obtained by assuming typical 
acceptances have 3 months maturity. 
Table 3 shows the value of acceptances originated by bank.
49 While banks with foreign 
branches usually ranked at the top, it appears that the acceptance market was quite competitive. 
Data published by Kniffin (1920) for May 1, 1917 enables us to compute a Herfindhal-
Hirschman acceptance market concentration index. We find 0.47 a low figure that is consistent 
with the null hypothesis of a competitive market. Using league tables in the Acceptance 
Bulletin and data from bank’s balance sheets, we find that the top four banks accounted for 30 
per cent of the market at the end of 1927, a substantial but not overwhelming fraction; to get 85 
per cent, one must consider 40 banks.
50  Given the fact that a fair number of banks with few or 
no foreign branches appear to have been active in the market, one can question the 
conventional view that branching was key.  The alternative interpretation would be that in 
order to increase acceptances one only needed good correspondents abroad, competitive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
institutions in operation. This being a British source, it may however have undercounted U.S. banks..  Where 
Phelps and Lewis list 57 National City Company branches in 1920 when Cleveland and Huertas have 81. As 
shown in the table, Cleveland and Huertas must be considering all the branches of the National City complex. 
49 This is assembled from the Acceptance Bulletin’s league tables for the value of acceptances originated. 
50  Acceptance Bulletin (January 1928), pp. 3-4.    
discount rates, reasonable transaction costs making the drawing of drafts on New York 
attractive, and ready access to a sufficiently large clientele.  
We now analyze these factors more systematically. Each bank, we assume, originates 
acceptances in proportion to capital and reserves (to which acceptances were tied through 
regulation or balance-sheet).
51 The bank’s acceptance business was also influenced by the total 
size of the market (the demand for trade credit), as captured by the value of acceptances or 
total U.S. trade (imports plus exports). Finally, we ask if branches matter.  
Data come from balance sheets for the period 1915-1939 for 20 banks.
52 In the 
illustrative example below (Figure 8), the exact same figure for acceptances ($6,482,165.82) 
appears both on the asset side (they are claims on customers) and on the liability side (the bank 
has committed itself to pay the amount at maturity).
53 Balance sheets were also used to gather 
figures for other bank attributes (capital, reserves, total assets etc.). U.S. trade is from the 
NBER database, total acceptances from the Acceptance Bulletin and Federal Reserve’s 
Banking and Monetary Statistics. All variables are in logs. 
Figure 8. Looking for Acceptance Data in Banks Balance Sheets 
 
Source: Kniffin 1920, p. 81. 
We use a simple dummy variable for branches.  While some banks branched more 
heavily than others, it is hard to know how to weigh a single branch in Paris against several 
branches in Cuba. Reassuringly, results were not affected by alternative specifications.
54 
                                                             
51 The Federal Reserve Act authorized national banks to purchase or discount acceptances up to 50 per cent of 
capital.  The ceiling was raised to 100 per cent subsequently. 
52  They come from the Baker Library at Harvard, Columbia’s Online Digital Collection, the British Library and 
the Graduate Institute collection of banks balance-sheets.  See appendix. 
53  Real- life situations tend to be more complex. Occasionally, acceptances on the liability side are mixed with 
related securities like credit lines. It was generally possible to get fairly reliable numbers, which were checked 
against the rankings in The Acceptance Bulletin’s league tables. 
54 We abstract from reverse causation. It could be, of course, that branching does not add more acceptances, but 
that banks that did a number of things had more acceptances and had then to branch in order to meet customers’    
The panel is unbalanced owing to missing observations (some banks were merged, 
others were closed).  We provide two sets of panel estimates, with and without clustered the 
standard errors.  The latter may are more appropriate, since we are combining bank-level and 
macroeconomic variables (Moulton 1990) . 
Tables 4 shows the results.  Bank size, whether measured by total assets or capital, is 
generally significant and has a positive effect.
55  The macro variables – total acceptances and 
total trade – are significant and positive.
56  Finally branching is in general significant. The 
existence of branches is associated with a 60 (upper bound estimate) per cent increase in 
outstanding acceptances.  
But magnitudes matter: what do the estimates imply for the role of branching in the 
growth of the market?  Recall that the top four banks controlled about 30 per cent of the total 
market for acceptances in 1928. Our estimates imply that, had not been for their branches, they 
would have had only 20 per cent of the market, a noticeable but not ruinous decline. The 
conclusion, therefore, is that branches helped but were not indispensible to the growth of the 
acceptance market.  Banks that did not go overseas were still able to enter the market, making 
use of their established connections with U.S. importers and exporters.   
Tables 5 and 6 assess the contribution of the Fed. Table 5 considers a narrow definition 
of Fed’s support: total acceptances held on the Fed’s own account. This variable tends to be 
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels even when it is included together with 
total acceptances outstanding and U.S. trade, with which it is collinear.
57 The point estimates 
move around (as a function of which control variables are included), but they uniformly 
suggest that Fed purchases were as important as the aggregate growth of the market for 
individual bank behavior.  Knowing that it might be possible to lay off acceptances on the Fed 
caused individual banks to respond roughly twice as fast to market growth as otherwise.  This 
makes sense: acceptances brought revenue while immobilizing close to zero capital. Banks 
thus were prepared to issue as many as they would be sure to sell (subject to regulatory 
constraints that tied acceptances to capital and reserves). If by contrast there were less buyers 
and banks faced the risk of having to buy their own paper, the cost of underwriting more 
acceptances rose, rendering banks more reluctant to originate them. 
The narrow definition of support may not be the best one. The Fed also received 
deposits from foreign central banks (prominently from the Bank of France) which it then 
parked as acceptances, again in part to foster the growth of the market. While the Fed did not 
determine the amounts deposited, it certainly decided what it would do with it – that it would 
recycle them as acceptances as opposed to other investments (it may have invested in 
treasuries, for instance). In Table 6 we therefore add these acceptances held by the Fed for the 
account of others to acceptances purchased for its own account.  The official-purchases 
variable is now even more significant than before, reinforcing the conclusion that they played 
an important-market making role. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
needs. However, considering this would weaken the case for branches, and given our later finding, this is not 
essential for us as it would only strengthen our conclusions. 
55 Introducing capital and total assets together creates a problem of multicollinearity, as one would expect. 
56 Although, again, multicollinearity is an issue. 
57 In this table and the one that follows we continue to cluster the standard errors.    
The results from Tables 5 and 6 suggest that, to the extent that the Federal Reserve 
helped the market through active purchases during the 1920s, it must by definition have 
penalized it when it withdrew in the 1930s. Evidently, the failure of the Fed to support the 
market after 1931 was an important factor in its absolute and relative decline. Reasons for this 
failure should be the topic of future research. A contemporary line, echoed in a recent 
monograph by Mehrling (2010), is that in driving up the price and driving down the return on 
acceptances the Fed made them less attractive for private investors to hold.  Banks in particular 
were encouraged to invest instead in more rewarding over the counter securities-repurchase 
agreements and loans to stock brokers. When crisis hit, the Fed then found itself having to 
choose between defending the dollar’s gold parity and providing support to the banks, which 
were heavily invested in government securities on the one hand, and continuing to support the 
nascent market in acceptances on the other.  Forced to choose, it opted to sacrifice the 
acceptances “infant industry,” which at that time had barely evolved beyond the juvenile stage. 
We undertook a number of robustness checks of these results.  In Table 7 we substitute 
an alternative measure of Fed support for the market, namely the spread between the official 
and commercial discount rates on acceptances.  The results are as before; these strongly 
support the notion that official support mattered.  In Table 8 we address the concern that Fed 
investments in acceptances and total investments in acceptances are simultaneously determined 
by redefining the dependent variable as the market share of an individual bank in an individual 
year.  The results are again consistent with what we found before, except that the effect of 
branching is now somewhat larger.  The second panel of the table, where we include the Fed’s 
share as an explanatory variable, suggests that official support for the market favored the big 
players disproportionately (big banks dominating our sample). 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper has offered new evidence on the rise of the dollar as an international currency 
during World War I and the interwar years. As a heuristic we have used the analogy between 
international currencies and network effects in the adoption of technologies.  The question is 
whether the international monetary and financial system was subject to strong lock-in and 
irreversibility, whether it could in fact be shifted from one equilibrium to another by large 
shocks and the actions of large players like central banks, or whether there were in fact limits 
on increasing returns and network externalities, permitting several monetary technologies to 
coexist.   
Much previous literature emphasizes the first hypothesis, and a good deal favors the 
second.  It is argued that sterling remained the dominant current in private as well as official 
international transactions until after World War II, long after the United States surpassed 
Britain as the largest economy and leading trading nation.  It is said that this lag between shifts 
in economic and monetary circumstances reflected the strength of increasing returns, network 
externalities, and London’s first-mover advantage.  When the shift finally occurred, it reflected 
the shock of the war and the support provided by the Fed.  To the extent that market forces 
played a role, they were mediated by the foreign branching of U.S. banks. 
In this paper we have challenged this conventional wisdom.  We show that the shift 
occurred already much earlier, during and after World War I.  Already in the 1920s the dollar 
rivaled and, indeed, surpassed sterling as a source of trade credit.  This finding parallels what    
we found previously for the official use of international currencies, that is, for the composition 
of central bank reserves.   
We show next that it was not merely the growth of foreign branches but also the growth 
of U.S. trade that allowed American banks to enter the market. Increased trade fostered the 
growth of a network of correspondents abroad that enabled American banks to enter the 
acceptance market as soon as they were endowed with competitive discount rates and freed 
from regulatory restrictions.    
We show third that not just market forces (the actions of American commercial banks and 
trust companies) but also public support – the Fed’s role as architect – played a role in the 
dollar’s rapid catch up and brief overtaking of sterling as the leading international currency.  
This occurred before a liquid secondary market of private and institutional investors to which 
the acceptances originated by U.S. banks and trust companies could be resold was built.
58  The 
mechanism that enabled to skip this stage was the Fed, which stepped in as secondary-market-
maker of last resort.  Our estimates suggest that the U.S. market in trade acceptances grew 
significantly faster than it would have in the absence of this official support.  There is a 
message here for governments like China’s seeking to promote international use of its 
currency.
59 
We show fourth that when central banks stepped out of the market for acceptances in the 
1930s, the market in dollar acceptances collapsed all but completely, whereas the market in 
sterling acceptances did not.  Evidently the task of building a new secondary market of 
individual and institutional investors, analogous to what London had already done in the 19
th 
century, was more difficult than supposed.  Indeed, the Fed’s aggressive intervention as buyer 
of last resort may have stifled rather than fostering the development of that market. 
We show finally that the image of strongly increasing returns and pervasive network 
externalities leaving room for only one monetary technology is misleading.  There were limits 
to these network effects.  There was room for both sterling and the dollar and for both London 
and New York all through the 1920s.  This suggests that there will be room for more than one 
international currency in the 21
st century.  It is not a winner-take-all game. 
                                                             
58 As explained by the industry’s advocate, the American Acceptance Council, the investor “would have to be 
educated, first as to the nature of a bankers’ acceptance, second as to its attractiveness as an investment, and third, 
owing to its quality as a doubly secured risk [that it was guaranteed both by the original issuer and the accepting 
bank], that it would be offered at a lower rate than he had been accustomed to, when buying the best single name 
commercial paper.”  American Acceptance Council (1931), p.17. 
59 China has already begun moving in this direction by encouraging limited use of the renminbi for trade 
settlements.  It is negotiating arrangements with Brazil whereby the two countries can use their own currency in 
bilateral transactions.  It has allowed select banks to issue renminbi-denominated bonds in Hong Kong and done a 
sovereign bond issue in renminbi there itself.  It has allowed the multilaterals to issue renminbi-denominated 
securities in Shanghai.    
Table 1. German and British Overseas Banks in Latin America 1913 vs. 1921 
(in £ million 1913) 
  MAIN LONDON AGENT  TOTAL ASSETS  CAPITAL 
  1913  1921  1913  1921  1913  1921 
German Foreign Banks in Latin America 
Banco Aleman Transat.  Deutsche Bk  Kleinwort  14.0  7.0  2.0  0.1 
Deutsch-Sudam. Bk.  Dresdner Bk  Kleinw, Shröd., Japhet  7.0  1.9  1.0  0.1 
Bk. für Chile und Deutsch.  Disconto (a)  None (b)  3.0  0.2  0.2  0.0 
Brazilian. Bk für Deutsch.  Disconto (a)  None (b)  7.0  0.8  0.5  0.1 
TOTAL      30.9  10  3.5  0.4 
Main British Overseas Banks in Latin America 
Anglo-South American  own  own  14.0  57.6  1.3  3.5 
London and River Plate  own  own  35.0  41.7  1.2  1.4 
London and Brazilian Bank  own  own  20.0  25.7  1.0  1.0 
TOTAL      69.0  125.0  3.5  5.9 
Source: Authors, from Bankers’ Almanac. Conversions in 1913 sterling made using price indices from B. R. 
Mitchell’s European Historical Statistics (1921 prices converted in 1913 prices) and the 1913 sterling parity of 
1£=20.4 M. 
Notes: (a) short hand for Discontogesellschaft Bank; (b) the Banker’s Almanac literally reported “ – ”. This is 
obviously curious in view of the fact that the whole point of the Almanac was to provide information regarding 
London Correspondents.    
                               
Source: BA: Authors’ Own estimates; Bankers’ Almanac, L: Lewis (1938), O: Other estimates for National City Bank grouping (Cleveland 
and Huertas (1985) and Federal Reserve Board Annual Reports). BA for 1920/21 is Bankers’ Almanac, 1921-22; Lewis Figures are for 1930-
31 corresponds to1929; BA 1930/31 is Bankers’ Almanac, 1931-32. 
Notes: (a) For BA 1930-31, in order to have consistency with other years, we have counted only one Cuba City branch for this date; (b) Lewis, 
(1938, p. 197) indicates that Bank of Haiti was sold to Haiti government in 1935. While Bank of Haiti still in BA, we thus no longer record it 
as a provider of branches for National City in BA 1941. (c) Equitable Eastern Banking Corporation was subsidiary of Equitable Trust. This is 
according to Federal Reserve Board Annual Report, 1920, p. 26. The Eastern Banking Corporation was set up in 1920. They were owned by 
Chase which used these as a start up for its foreign branches (d) Spread between Lewis and Bankers Almanac in 1920/21 numbers comes from 





                                           
L  BA  L  BA  O  L  O  L  BA  O  L  O  BA  O 
National City Bank (total) of which:  16  17  86  78  81  74  90  94  105  97  84  71  54  49 
National City Bank (plus Paris subsid.) (a)  0  0  57  46  -  42  -  74  82  -  69  -  52  - 
National City Company  -  0  -  0  -  -  -  -  8  -  -  -  0  - 
International Banking Corporation  16  17  29  32  -  32  -  9  3  -  3  -  2  - 
Bank of Haiti Inc. (b)  0  0  0  0  -  -  -  11  12  -  12  -  -  - 
Chase National Bank/Chase Bank  0  0  0  0  -  -  -  3  13  -  10  -  13  - 
Equitable Trust Co 
 (and Equit. East. Bk. Corp)(c) 
2  2  2  2  -  6  -  2  3  -  0  -  0  - 
First National Bank of Boston  0  0  1  1  -  2  -  4  6  -  12  -  6  - 
Bk of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass. SF  0  0  0  0  -  -  -  0  1  -  1  -  1  - 
Bankers Trust Co  0  0  1  1  -  2  -  2  2  -  1  -  0  - 
Farmers Loan and Trust  2  2  2  2  -  1  -  0  0  -  0  -  0  - 
Guaranty Trust  0  0  7  10  -  8  -  8  8  -  8  -  5  - 
Empire Trust Co  1  1  1  1  -  1  -  1  1  -  1  -  0  - 
American Trust Co  0  0  0  0  -  0  -  1  0  -  0  -  0  - 
International Trust  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  - 
Continental Guaranty Corporation  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  0  -  -  -  0  - 
City Bank Farmers Trust Cy  -  0  -  0  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  0  - 
Dillon Reed Corporation  -  0  -  0  -  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  0  - 
Total American Banks and Trusts  21  22  100  96  -  94  -  115  142  -  117  -  79  - 
American Foreign Banking Corporation  0  0  19  7  -  3  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
American International Corporation  -  -  -  1  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Asia Banking Corporation  0  0  9  9  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Bank of Central and South America  0  0  0  0  -  23  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Continental Banking and Trust  4  0  4  0  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Mercantile Bank of the Americas (d)  0  0  45  3  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Park-Union Foreign Banking Corporation  0  0  4  4  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Total American Foreign Banking Corporations  4  0  81  23  -  26  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
American Express  -  15  -  35  -  -  -  -  57  -  -  -  23  - 
United States Express Cy  -  2  -  2  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
American Trading Cy  -  0  -  29  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation  -  0  -  2  -  -  -  -  34  -  -  -  -  - 
Total American Trading Outfits  -  17  -  68  -  -  -  -  91  -  -  -  23  -     
                                  
  Place  1917  1922   1923   1927  1928   1929  1930  1931  1932   1933  1934   1935   1936  
COMMERCIAL BANKS AND TRUST 
National City                             
National City Bk  NYC  4  2  2  1  1  2  3  2  3  3  3  3  1 
Farm. Loan & Tr.  NYC  n.a.  48  41  26  28  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Chase                             
Chase National  NYC  6  8  10  3  2  3  1  1  1  2  2  2  2 
Nat’l Park Bank  NYC  8  29  [19]  31  22  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Equit. Trust Cy  NYC  n.a.  4  4  5  9  5  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Seabord Nat’l Tr.  NYC  60  30  15  14  19  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Guaranty                             
Guaranty Trust   NYC  n.a.  1  1  4  3  1  2  3  2  1  1  1  3 
Nat’l Bk. of Com.  NYC  2  5  6  6  4  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
First Nat’l Bk of B.  Bost.  1  7  8  8  7  7  8  9  11  10  7  5  5 
Irving Trust                             
Irving Nat’l Bk (a)  NYC  13  6  6  7  6  6  5  4  6  6  5  7  7 
Ameri. Exch Nat'l  NYC  7  21  25  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
National Shawmut  Bost.  5  9  13  11  12  15  17  16  14  16  15  14  12 
Bankers' Trust  NYC  -  12  12  13  14  13  15  5  5  5  6  21  18 
Old Colony Trust  Bost.  3  22  26  40  -  [42]  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Mech. Metals Nat’l  NYC  9  26  24  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
JP Morgan & Cy  NYC  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  11  19  38 
PRIVATE BANKS 
Brown                             
-Brown Brothers (b)  NYC  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12  15  10  22  12  12  12  12  9  8 
-Harriman Bthrs  NYC  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -  29  31  29  -  -  x  x  x  x 
Kid. Peab. Ac. Corp  Bost.  x  n.a.  n.a.  10  10  11  12  38  x  x  x  x  x 
Shroder Bkg Corp  NYC  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  15  17  16  11  14  13  23  24  19  19 
Goldman Sachs  NYC  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  16  16  17  23  30  26  33  31  29  34 
Lee Higginson  Bost.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  18  24  24  20  21  22  22  x  x  x 
Huth & Cy  NYC  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  22  26  28  31  35  38  51  44  38  35 
Lazard  NYC  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -  -  -  -  39  33  42  -  -  - 
Heidelbach, Ickel.  NYC  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  33  -  [40]  -  -  54  45  53  55  56 
US FOREIGN BANKS INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
Warburg                             
-IAB  NYC  x  3  3  2  5  4  4  6  x  x  x  x  x 
-Bk of Manh. Cy (c)  NYC  -  -  -  19  13  18  -  -  4  4  4  6  6 
Fr. Am. Bkg Corp.  NYC  x  24  25  24  25  21  19  27  20  13  16  16  16 
Bque Belge P. l'Etr.  NYC  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  40  28  31  32  31  32 
B. Com. Ital.  NYC  -  -  -  36  36  33  38  -  47  41  85  49  38 
Royal Bk of Canada  NYC  -  -  -  21  17  23  26  29  18  20  19  18  11 
Asia Bkg Corp.  NYC  n.a.  28  29  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Equ. East. B. Crp (d)  NYC  n.a.  n.a.  -  -  30  20  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
                                                                                                               
                                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                      
                      
      
                                                                  
                                                                         
                                    
                                                                                         
    
                                             
                                                            
                                             
 
                   
I II III IV V VI VII
- Total Assets/Liabilities 0.90 (12.19) 0.72 (13.53) 0.73 (13.21) -- -- -- 0.59 (3.91)
- Capital, Surplus and Undivided Profits -- -- -- 0.94 (13.45) 0.67 (12.43) 0.72 (12.36) 0.15 (0.99)
 - US total trade (Exports+ Imports) 0.68 (4.70) -- 0.08 (0.68) 0.83 (5.86) -- 0.25 (2.10) 0.12 (1.01)
- Total US acceptances outstanding -- 1.05 (12.72) 1.03 (11.61) -- 0.96 (11.10) 0.88 (9.37) 0.99 (10.34)
- Branching 0.30 (2.41) 0.57 (6.09) 0.55 (5.71) 0.32 (2.66) 0.64 (6.79) 0.58 (5.79) 0.54 (5.53)
- Intercept -8.92 (-6.25) -8.77 (-14.27) -9.36 (-8.77) -8.35 (-6.23) -6.37 (-11.01) -8.25 (-7.74) -9.27 (-8.65)
N 262 249 249 263 250 250 249
Adjusted R_ 0.51 0.72 0.72 0.55 0.70 0.71 0.72
 
                
I II III IV V VI VII
- Total Assets/Liabilities 0.90 (11.64) 0.72 (8.46) 0.73 (8.49) -- -- -- 0.59 (2.48)
- Capital, Surplus and Undivided Profits -- -- -- 0.94 (13.15) 0.67 (8.43) 0.72 (8.70) 0.15 (0.73)
 - US total trade (Exports+ Imports) 0.68 (4.66) -- 0.08 (0.42) 0.83 (5.68) -- 0.25 (1.32) 0.12 (0.65)
- Total US acceptances outstanding -- 1.05 (10.88) 1.03 (9.44) -- 0.96 (8.42) 0.88 (7.08) 0.99 (9.91)
- Branching 0.30 (1.47) 0.57 (3.55) 0.55 (3.26) 0.32 (1.55) 0.64 (3.58) 0.58 (2.94) 0.54 (3.15)
- Intercept -8.92 (-6.96) -8.77 (-16.28) -9.36 (-6.39) -8.35 (-6.20) -6.37 (-9.36) -8.25 (-4.98) -9.27 (-6.35)
N 262 249 249 263 250 250 249




    
                                                                                                   
                                                            
                                                                    
                
I II III IV V VI VII
- Total Assets/Liabilities 1.00 (10.36) 0.94 (9.26) 0.94 (9.30) -- -- -- 0.72 (2.77)
- Capital, Surplus and Undivided Profits -- -- -- 0.97 (15.72) 0.92 (11.60) 0.93 (11.83) 0.24 (1.05)
 - US total trade (Exports+ Imports) -0.09 (-0.69) -- -0.10 (-0.68) 0.10 (0.70) -- 0.08 (0.56) -0.04 (-0.25)
- Total US acceptances outstanding -- 0.42 (2.65) 0.42 (2.65) -- 0.21 (1.27) 0.21 (1.22) 0.34 (2.26)
- Fed Acceptances/"own account" 0.27 (3.17) 0.15 (1.64) 0.18 (2.12) 0.27 (3.03) 0.27 (2.86) 0.24 (2.67) 0.20 (2.18)
- Branching 0.22 (1.44) 0.30 (1.96) 0.31 (2.09) 0.32 (2.07) 0.39 (2.38) 0.37 (2.27) 0.30 (2.02)
- Intercept -3.80 (-3.31) -6.48 (-8.99) -5.80 (-5.64) -3.28 (-2.83) -3.59 (-3.72) -4.18 (-3.63) -5.52 (-5.37)
N 205 205 205 206 206 206 205
R_ 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.74
 
                         
                                                                                            
                                            
                                                            
                                                                   
                
I II III IV V VI VII
- Total Assets/Liabilities 0.90 (10.00) 0.83 (8.84) 0.83 (8.76) -- -- -- 0.66 (2.80)
- Capital, Surplus and Undivided Profits -- -- -- 0.88 (13.92) 0.80 (11.43) 0.81 (11.01) 0.19 (0.94)
 - US total trade (Exports+ Imports) -0.12 (-0.77) -- -0.13 (-0.83) 0.12 (0.72) -- 0.08 (0.50) -0.07 (-0.45)
- Total US acceptances outstanding -- 0.53 (3.66) 0.54 (3.66) -- 0.41 (2.71) 0.40 (2.59) 0.49 (3.67)
- Fed Acceptances/"own account" 0.22 (12.71) 0.14 (4.35) 0.14 (5.14) 0.19 (9.00) 0.14 (4.33) 0.14 (4.59) 0.15 (5.19)
- Branching 0.31 (1.95) 0.40 (2.51) 0.42 (2.57) 0.36 (2.15) 0.47 (2.76) 0.45 (2.49) 0.40 (2.48)
- Intercept -2.76 (-1.96) -6.59 (-9.13) -5.45 (-4.14) -2.62 (-1.79) -3.77 (-4.54) -4.48 (-2.91) -5.31 (-3.98)
N 249 249 249 250 250 250 249





    
 
 
                                                                         
                                                            
                                                                         
                
I II III IV V VI VII
- Total Assets/Liabilities 0.82 (9.66) 0.75 (8.79) 0.74 (8.60) -- -- -- 0.64 (2.67)
- Capital, Surplus and Undivided Profits -- -- -- 0.84 (12.08) 0.73 (9.44) 0.73 (8.85) 0.12 (0.57)
 - US total trade (Exports+ Imports) -0.71 (-2.57) -- -0.35 (-1.62) -0.27 (-1.05) -- -0.04 (-0.18) -0.30 (-1.34)
- Total US acceptances outstanding -- 0.92 (7.47) 0.89 (8.20) -- 0.75 (6.00) 0.75 (6.41) 0.86 (8.54)
- Spread (Fed-Commercial) -0.92 (-5.52) -0.15 (-1.26) -0.36 (-2.75) -0.71 (-4.22) -0.24 (-1.89) -0.26 (-1.93) -0.35 (-2.69)
- Branching 0.42 (2.63) 0.52 (3.14) 0.54 (3.22) 0.42 (2.47) 0.56 (2.95) 0.57 (2.90) 0.53 (3.13)
- Intercept 4.72 (1.70) -7.97 (-10.26) -4.46 (-2.44) 2.44 (0.97) -5.02 (-6.25) -4.61 (-2.38) -4.56 (-2.51)
N 245 245 245 246 246 246 245
R_ 0.63 0.72 0.72 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.72
    
                                                                      
                                                 
                                             
                
I II III
- Total Assets/Liabilities 0.72 (8.67) -- 0.62 (2.58)
- Capital, Surplus and Undivided Profits -- 0.67 (8.80) 0.11 (0.53)
- Branching 0.57 (3.52) 0.65 (3.60) 0.57 (3.50)
- Intercept -8.45 (-8.21) -6.64 (-24.37) -8.24 (-11.39)
N 249 250 249
R_ 0.66 0.63 0.66
 
                                      
I II III
- Total Assets/Liabilities 0.77 (9.47) -- 0.73 (3.03)
- Capital, Surplus and Undivided Profits -- 0.69 (10.20) 0.04 (0.20)
- Branching 0.50 (3.20) 0.61 (3.41) 0.50 (3.19)
- Federal Reserve Share 0.07 (3.23) 0.06 (2.19) 0.07 (3.15)
- Intercept -8.58 (-18.35) -6.62 (-25.41) -8.50 (-11.77)
N 249 250 249
R_ 0.68 0.65 0.68
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Data Sources for Regression Analysis: 
 
US Banks data: 
Extracted from 31
st December balance-sheet (or closest available date). Balance-sheets were 
collected from Baker Library (Harvard), Columbia University Library, British Library 
(London) and Graduate Institute Library (Geneva). The banks in the sample are as follows 
(periods for which we have data are indicated). 
 
American Exchange Irving Trust 1927-1928 
Bank of New York and Trust Company 1922-1938 
Bank of the Manhattan Company 1924-1935 (missing years) 
Bankers Trust Company 1915-1935 
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company 1930-1935 
Chase Bank 1915-1938 (missing years) 
Chemical Bank and Trust Company 1929-1935 
Commercial National Bank and Trust Cy of  NY 1929-1939 
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company 1932-1935 
First National Bank of Boston 1915-1935 
First National Bank of Chicago 1915-1935 
Guaranty Trust 1914-1937 
International Accpetance Bank 1929 
Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Company 1920-1926 
Manufacturers Trust Company 1924-1935 
Marine Midland 1929-1935 
National City Bank of new york 1915-1935 
National Bank of Commerce in New York 1923-1928 
Old Colony Trust Company 1919-1929 (missing years) 
New York Trust Company 1920-1935 
Philadelphia National Bank 1926-1935 (missing years) 
Wells Fargo 1921-1935 
 
Heavy Branching dummies: 
Dummy equals 1 for Chase, First National Bank of Boston, Guaranty Trust, National City 
Bank 
 
Total Acceptances Outstanding: 
December totals from Acceptances Bulletin and Federal Reserve, as described in Text. 
 
Federal Reserve Holdings of Acceptances (own and foreign accounts). 
December observation from Federal Reserve Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 